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he questions ‘what is a ‘child?’ or
‘what rights do children have?’ are far
from being consensually answer ed. In
fact, children have been more  commonly
 defined for what they are not than for what
they are.
In a 1973 article, Children Under the Law,
Hillary Clinton (then an attorney) argued for
an interesting point of view: children's rights
were a “slogan in need of a definition”.
Her suggestion was to abolish the legal status
of children as minors, and instead ensure that
all the procedural rights guaranteed to adults
under the American Constitution should be
granted to children whenever the state moves
against them. For her, describing a ‘minor’ as
‘everyone under 18 or 21’ was artificial and
did not take into account the diﬀerences in
competency levels and maturity amongst
children of diﬀerent ages.
In a very creative and surprising move, Clin-
ton argued in favour of creating something
like a ‘scale’ whereby children could
 ‘gradually’ see their maturity and competence
recognised.
Now, in 2009, 20 years since the Convention
on the Rights of the Child was created, the
notion of children’s rights is yet to be well de-
fined. There is no singularly accepted defini-
tion or theory on the rights held by children.
Today Somalia and the United States are the
only countries who have not ratified the Con-
vention. In fact, in 2002, Somalia's previous
transitional government signed the Conven-
tion, just as the United States did under Clin-
ton’s presidency in 1995, though neither has
ratified it. However UNICEF announced last
November that the Somali Cabinet of
 Ministers has agreed to ratify the Convention.
This makes the Convention the most widely
ratified international human rights treaty,
leaving the United States as the only country
outside the pact.
In the Introduction of The Moral and Politi-
cal Status of Children, (from 2002), the edi-
tors recognise that an apparent trend already
exists towards viewing children as distinct
 individuals and as subjects of moral and
 political theory. They clarify in the book that
the so-called status of children does not really
refer to their ‘moral or political status’.  Better,
it addresses the question of how we should
define a child (p. 13).
They argue that defining someone as a child
under chronological criteria seems inappro-
priate. It also seems inaccurate to define a
child by referring to their lack of ability when
compared to adults when some adults lack
those same competencies. Archard and
 MacLeod argue against the division generally
made between ‘childhood’ and ‘adulthood’.
More properly, we should distinguish
 between the terms ‘infants’, ‘young people’,
‘teenagers’ and ‘adolescents’, instead of using
‘childhood’ to refer to all groups (p.14).
The anthology is structured in three parts
which explore the diﬀerent dimensions of the
main topic: I. Children and Rights; II.
 Autonomy and Education and; III. Children,
Families and Justice.
The first block consists of five articles on the
definition of children’s rights.
An interesting thesis is one defended by James
Griﬃn in the first article Do children have
Rights?. He contributes to the extensive
 debate around legal and human rights. He
 argues confidently for children having legal
rights but questions if they also have human
rights (pp. 19-21). He starts by comparing
children’s vulnerable status to zygotes,
 embryos, foetuses, animals or severe mentally
impaired people. Griﬃn believes human
rights can be defined as a shield for our
human standing, our ‘personhood’. Person-
hood can be defined when we analyse the
concept of ‘agency’. Being an agent means ha-
ving the ability of assessing and making choi-
ces, taking decisions concerning one’s own
course through life. Furthermore, the author
argues that ‘personhood’ cannot be the only
ground for human rights. He is not particu-
larly explicit when explaining which other
grounds should be taken into account when
we are referring to human rights. But he
briefly describes those grounds as ‘practicali-
ties’ (pp. 23-24).
Referring to the Convention, the author
identifies the purpose of this legislation as an
instrument to protect vulnerable children.
The author concludes that infants have no
‘human rights’, just like severe mentally
 impaired people, but that society in general
imposes on itself heavier obligations towards
them. Nevertheless, many children, though
not infants, are capable of agency. For that
reason, the author agrees that children may
be entitled to rights, given that human rights
are claims that individuals can make against
others, including their society (p. 28).
Harry Brighouse’s point of view, in What
Rights (if any) do Children Have? does not
 diﬀer greatly from Griﬃn’s article. He begins
by saying that fundamental rights, seen from
the liberal perspective, are concerned with
autonomous capable individuals and for that
reason, we cannot assume that children have
them. However, he argues children can be
granted legal rights. He believes that children
have solely welfare rights instead of agency
rights (pp. 31-32). And he goes further: chil-
dren not only lack fundamental rights but at-
tributing those types of rights to them would
risk their best interests (p. 32). Here the
 author makes an exception. He says that it is
acceptable to grant children some agency
rights, but only in as far as those rights are dif-
ferent from those of adults and when the age
of entitlement is clearly specified. This ought
to be made in respect to their welfare rights
and their prospective autonomy. Brighouse
argues that the Convention jeopardizes chil-
dren’s prospective autonomy, granting some
legal agency rights to young children, and at
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the same time, giving parents too much ef-
fective control over the development of their
rational abilities and their access to informa-
tion (p. 51-52).
In Children’s Choices or Children’s Interests:
Which do their Rights Protect? Samantha Bren-
nan intelligently presents the debate between
the choice theory of rights and the interest
theory of rights (pp. 55-63). Again, there is
the suggestion of graduating the conceptions
of rights in such a way that one can protect
both choices and interests. She stands for a
‘compromise’ between the two models where,
in the beginning, rights for children function
to protect their interests and as they grow up
and become autonomous choosers, rights
function as a protection of their own indivi-
dual choices. This theory is directly connected
to Neil MacCormick’s, who argued for a
 reconciliation of both theories: choices’ and
interests’. He stands up for a common foun-
dation for both sorts of rights. Brennan finds
his theory attractive but disagrees with him
when he believes that rights do not only pro-
tect interests but choices as well. The author
argues that MacCormick does not give us the
answer about the foundation of these rights.
She  argues that these rights base themselves
on the protection of choices even if those
choices are against the chooser’s best interests.
For her, children are “would-be choosers”
and, such as adults, they do have rights, only
from a  diﬀerent kind (pp. 63-67).
Barbara Arneil brings us Becoming versus
Being: A Critical Analysis of the Child in Libe-
ral Theory. The early liberal theory classifies
children as potential right-bearing citizens: on
one hand, “half beings with a kernel of ratio-
nality” and, on the other hand, “the negation
of their future adult form” since there are still
seen as irrational creatures. The definition of
‘becoming’ derives from seeing children as
 future adults and not as already existing
 independent human beings. For John Locke,
the ‘product’ of ‘becoming’ will be the
 rational citizen or the property owner,  capable
of understanding rules and accepting author -
ity and the State (pp. 71-74).
Several theories on children’s rights have tried
to deny this point of view, arguing that chil-
dren are beings entitled with rights. Against
Locke’s position, where only the father had
something to say, here the state and society
must get involved in their lives and take care
of them as well. Similarly to Brighouse, Ar-
neil finishes by saying that a possible solution
should emphasize responsibilities towards chil-
dren rather than focusing on rights, in a way
that allows us to better address children’s
150
 interests (pp. 75-86).
The article is quite descriptive albeit  coherent -
ly argued. However, it may not add much to
the discussion. The solution pointed out by
the author does not seem creative or a true
answer to the question. It opens a second
door towards ethics but does not close the
first towards rights (pp. 89-91). The other
three authors in this chapter assumed a more
practical and interesting approach, even if, in
some cases, like Brighouse’s, the article does
not have so many references or a well
 balanced structure. In fact, Brighouse barely
stepped away from Onora O’Neill, Robert
Godin and Dianne Gibson in his references.
Griﬃn and Brennan have clear and profound
articles, carrying true answers and pointing
out relevant references on the subject.
The second part of the book tries to relate the
progressive autonomy gained by children as
they grow up with progressive moral evolu-
tion, achieved by education.
Robert Noggle starts his chapter with a very
explicit position: children should not be given
a completely open future by making their
present free of values or religious concepts
(pp. 112-115). In Special Agents: Children’s
autonomy and Parental Authority he says that
if we do so, we would be preventing children
from progressing from what he calls “a  special
agent” to a full developed, “temporally
 extended moral agent” with a sense of moral
decency. He describes the relation between
children and their parents as a fiduciary one
where the parents should decide under a kind
of Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” how to raise
the moral new being (pp. 97-100). He
 believes children should carry the moral
 values of their families in the early stages to
avoid them from being raised without prin-
ciples at all. Otherwise, we could expect a
“moral psychopath” (p. 111). However,
 parents cannot force children to keep these
values when they grow up.
The idea of applying Rawl’s theory to chil-
dren’s education is not new. However, the way
the author relates it with the fiduciary special
relationship between parents and children is
very interesting and seems to explain well the
moral relationship between both agents. Nog-
gle does not hide himself behind hypocrisy
and assumes that children are not free to
choose their moral and religious values. On
the other hand, parents do not have permis-
sion to perpetuate their own beliefs in time
nor have they the right to do it in an intole-
rant, unreasonable way.
The second article, Autonomy, Child-Rearing,
and Good Lives by Eamonn Callan tries to
 explain that autonomy is a sine qua non con-
dition to a ‘good life’ at least, from a liberal
point of view (p. 118). However, what ‘a good
life’ is or what ‘a good life’ seems to be is
unclear. Thus, autonomy would be an
 instrument which helps enable agents to
make their own choices according to their
own conception of good (p. 119-121).
 Nevertheless, the instrumental theory collap-
ses once we acknowledge that autonomy can
be a virtue and not just an instrumental
 insipid thing. Therefore, the author tries to
explain that emphasizing autonomy as an
 instrument, could lead to failure of our
 judgement about goodness (p. 123). Callan
 argues that, not only have we to gain auto-
nomy, but we also need to recognise the im-
portance of fostering our capacities leading to
a conception of good. Autonomy belongs to
character rather than being a mere instrument.
From Callan’s liberal point of view, exposing
children to a multicultural environment may
not facilitate this task (p. 137-138).
David Archard develops this issue in his
 article Children, Multiculturalism, and Educa-
tion. He attempts to become clearer about the
balance required between individuals’ or
groups’ interests and children’s interests to
 acquire (or not) an identity as an individual.
He argues that it is legitimate for a group or
family to transmit its own values to children
and that the existence of cultural diversity is
not, in itself, a bad thing.
However it is wrong to raise children merely
as means to the fulfilment of parental or a
group’s wishes. Children have, as future
adults, an interest in how they will be raised.
But raising a child as a mere future group
member may contribute to prevent her to
choose any other paths in her life. So then
what does it mean to have a right to an ‘open-
future’? There is a right for parents to share
their family life with children to such an
 extent that children may be raised to share the
 values of the group. Just like Noogle, Archard
 believes neither the parents nor groups have
the right to impose their way of life to the next
generation. (pp. 158-159).
Archard claims that children may bear the
cost of being exposed to diﬀerences between
their families’ values and the ones existing in
society (pp. 150-152).
Joe Coleman’s brilliant article Answering
Susan: Liberalism, Civic Education and the
Status of Younger Persons starts with an hypo-
thetical situation where Susan, a 15 years old
girl and a 10th grade student, addresses a
panel of political theorists that are debating
topics such as what does liberalism require in
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the way of civic education. Coleman realises
that if on one hand, young children lack a
 capacity to understand a Rawlsian concept of
the good, on the other hand, we cannot
 advocate that an adolescent closer to majority
lacks that power as well. Coleman advocates
a more democratic, participation-orientated
approach where educators and students are
seen as equals.
The author points to a very relevant and
 fallacious aspect of liberal theory about citi-
zenship and age (pp. 163. Liberals accept a
person as a citizen as long as that person
achieves 18 years of age (in most countries).
The status of childhood cannot be limited by
any artificial criteria (p. 170). Joe Coleman’s
article is, indeed, one of the most well written
articles in the whole book and deserves our
praise. In fact, Coleman reaches important
conclusions, written in a pleasantly amusing
albeit serious way.
Hillel Steiner starts the third chapter of the
book. This final cluster of essays is dedicated
to issues concerning distributive justice. In
 Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Talent Diﬀe-
rentials and Distributive Justice he approaches
some polemic – and still present – ethical
questions. Steiner theorizes about what
people should give or get from others. The
author says that this question should be
 answered by taking into account one’s talents
or abilities (p. 183). This is important when
we deal with children’s education or the
 development of children’s abilities. The
 author wants to show how diﬀerences in
 natural endowment can lead to inequalities
(p. 184). It is said that children have a right to
claim against adults, for they have the obliga-
tion of creating the necessary environment for
children to develop in. Is it possible for chil-
dren to claim from their parents a better
 genetic heritage? Steiner argues that children
could claim a right against bad genetic
 endowment, as long as the changes that could
have been made did not change the person’s
(child’s) identity (p. 190).
From a softer point of view, Peter Vallentyne
in Equality and the Duties of Procreators advo-
cates that the only special duty procreators
have towards their children is to ensure that
they have good perspectives in life and that
they do not violate their rights (p. 195). It is
oﬀered that agents have the moral duty of de-
ciding not to have children when there are
bad prospects for the oﬀspring’s life (p. 199).
However, there is no special duty to assure the
oﬀspring have the highest standards of life
possible.
Colin MacLeod’s article Liberal Equality and
the Aﬀective Family tries to conciliate liberal
theory with children’s special status. He
 recognises that liberals did not pay much
 attention to the role of children or their sta-
tus. Children should be seen as full, equal and
distinct subjects. If liberal ideology allows
some inequalities among adults, those
 inequalities should not be reflected (or com-
pletely reflected) on children. (p. 219) Public
provisions could help to reduce these inequa-
lities. It is acceptable that some inequalities
arise among adults due to individual choices
made in an initial position of equality, but it
is not that when those diﬀerences arise due to
other factors such as social or natural  con -
tingencies. Another interesting point is that
inequalities arise among children because pa-
rents care more about their own children than
about others’. MacLeod believes that it is pos-
sible to limit these ‘side-eﬀects of love’ by
 pursuing social policies that constrain parents
to express themselves impartially about their
own children (pp. 226-228).
It is hard to understand how this would be
possible in a liberal society. This may be the
only weakness of his thesis. This position
could hardly cope with the liberal ideals of
choice, freedom and propriety.
What Children Really Need: Towards a Critical
Theory of Family Structure, by Shelley Burtt,
tells us about the family structure in the USA.
During the 90’s, approximately half the chil-
dren that were born were raised by single-pa-
rent families, thereby increasing poverty rates
(p. 231). This phenomenon made most
 politicians and scholars argue in favour of a
return to the traditional family model in
order to ‘disguise’ the moral and economical
failure of society (p. 232-234). Burtt thinks
it is more important to create new policies
that cope with the diﬀerent family models
existing at present. She stands for a “critical
theory of family structure” where one evalua-
tes children’s needs and also gives some clues
on how to achieve those needs in each kind of
family model (pp. 241-245).
The book ends with Véronique Muñoz-Dar-
dé’s article, addressing some questions Ma-
cleod already approached. In Family, Choice
and Distributive Justice she says something
very pertinent: the simple existence of family
is so strong, that it can for itself impair the
access of individuals to equal opportunities.
This aﬀects not only material distribution. It
aﬀects the moral and psychological develop-
ment of the child and their ability to have a
future in equal circumstances.
However a fair society must contain a family
in some form. But if we agree with it, we
must be aware that individuals will not have
equal opportunities in life. The conclusion is
that a theory of justice, even a Rawlsian one,
cannot have equal opportunity as a prior
principle to family (pp. 267-268).
This book oﬀers a good opportunity to go
deeper into such subjects concerning chil-
dren’s rights (especially the debate around
children’s status, welfare or agency rights).
It is especially pertinent given that the debate
about children’s rights has grown in the last
years.
Should today’s adolescents be treated as
 infants, when it is known that they possess
nearly the same capacities and knowledge as
an adult? Should we abolish the idea of
 majority because it is based on artificial and
mainly historical criteria? Again, the question
of creating a “graduation scale” arises.
After reading the preamble of the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, we could say
that the Convention was created under the
vision that entitles children to welfare rights
but without agency rights. It is said that chil-
dren should be “aﬀorded the necessary pro-
tection and assistance, recognising that the
child, for the full and harmonious develop-
ment of his or her personality, should grow
up in a family environment, in an atmosphere
of happiness, love and understanding”.
 Moreover, it is said that a child should be fully
prepared to live an individual life in society. It
goes without saying that in this legislation,
the child is not yet seen as a full moral indi-
vidual, but rather like a human being ‘under
construction’. This Aristotelian concept of
children – as being something similar to
 ‘unfinished human beings’ – is still the
 predominant theory.
However, today we can observe a rising inte-
rest in the idea that children should be recog-
nised as capable individuals. A good example
of this change in focus is the motion for a re-
solution presented to the Council of Europe
last May which proposed lowering the voting
age to 16 in all the countries from the Coun-
cil.
Despite the fact that it may be a little
 exhaustive or repetitive concerning liberal
theory and John Rawls’ works – and some -
times not particularly innovative – we can
 surely recommend this book as a major,
 provocative and still up to date reference on
the topic.
David Archard and Colin MacLeod (eds).
(2003): The Moral and Political Status of Chil-
dren. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 296
pages. ISBN 0199242682. Price: £64.60/$65.
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